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Abstract
This paper attempts to quantify the maximum amount of debt that a gov-
ernment can sustain by itself, i.e., the limits to public indebtedness. Using
a Dynamic General Equilibrium model where the government is fully charac-
terized, we compute the steady state inverse relationship between the public
debt to output ratio and the size of the government, measured as the total
public expenditures to output ratio. This line is the budget constraint of a
government in steady state. Calibration of the model for the Greek economy
to scal targets reveals that, for the period just before the current recession,
i.e. 2002-2006, the debt to GDP ratio was very close to the calculate limits
wich depends dramatically on the interest rates. However, short after de -
nancial crisis of 2008, sustained decits drove the Greek economy to a point
where the Greek Government crossed the debt limit where the country could
only meet its debt obligations only if international investors where willing
to lend. We conclude that the hight initial level of debts previous the crisis
together with the rise in interest rates were the causes of the posterior debt
crisis.
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1 Introduction
One of the many debates caused by the recent international nancial crisis has
focused the attention of economists and policy makers on the sovereign debt sus-
tainability. As a result, a controversy about the causes and the cures of debt crisis,
which is still hitting some countries of the Euro Area with particular intensity, has
emerged. Some of the proposed solutions for the European debt crisis shows that
the perceived origins of this crisis can be found in i) A crisis of imbalances, caused
by the weak competitiveness of peripheral Europe, and ii) A scal crisis, due to
either direct scal indiscipline in the cases of Portugal and Greece, and irresponsible
nancial policies that triggered excessive scal guarantees, as in the cases of Ireland
and Spain.
However, in this paper we claim that Greece was before the crisis a country that
could be compared to other eurozone member states in all scal dimensions: Public
spending over GDP, expenditure structure, average tax rates, number of public
employees, etc., and therefore we argue that the current debt crisis hitting the Greek
economy is not due to past scal indiscipline or to initial inherently unsustainable
debt levels but a consequence of government attitude towards the crisis, together
with a spike in the interest rates faced by the Greek bond which nally triggered
the Greek public nancial disaster.
To support this claim, we attempt to quantify the maximum amount of debt
that a government can sustain by itself, its sovereign debt limit. Beyond that limit
the government risks the possibility of a self-fullling crisis. These crises arise when
lenders think that a government will not repay its debt. If lenders think a government
will not repay, they do not lend. If a government cannot roll over the portion of its
debt becoming due within a period, it may choose to default even though it would
not default if the lenders do lend. This is the idea in Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000).
The maximum level of debt that can be sustained if lenders do not lend is much
lower than the maximum that can be sustained if they do lend. We use a Dynamic
General Equilibrium (DGE) model to compute those limits, to show that Greece
was well below the critical thresholds.
Conesa and Kehoe (2015) show that governments with low debt can choose to
run this debt up to levels where they risk crises if their country is unlucky enough
to be in a recession period after period. This is the idea of gambling for redemption,
where a xed and exogenous probability of a recovery entices governments to gamble
with the expenditure-debt policy, risking a default if period after period the recovery
does not occur and a sunspot realization scares international lenders away.
We compute the debt limits where the Cole-Conesa-Kehoe kind of arguments
are more likely to explain what has occurred to Greece.
We dene an equilibrium where the government roll over its debt and another
equilibrium where it cannot do so, and calculate the welfare of the consumers at
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each equilibrium. If debts levels are too large, it can be optimal for the government
to decide to default on its debts, and this decision implicitly denes what it is a
sustainable debt level. We show that using a diagram where two key ratios of scal
data (the debt/output and the government spending/output) are plotted together, is
useful to asses how close an economy is from the default decision. For this diagram,
we compute the steady state relationship between the public debt/output ratio and
the size of the government, measured as the total public expenditures/output ratio.
This line is called the government budget constraint . Along this line the econ-
omy has to generate enough primary scal surpluses to nance current government
expenditures plus the interest service of its debts, rolling over the existing debt
with zero decits. Therefore, the budbet constraint provides the maximum level
of sustainable debt with rolling over. The debt frontier provides a picture dividing
the long term sustainable region from the long term unsustainable region for any
given level of public expenditure to GDP ratio. At the right of the debt frontier, all
traders know that the economy cannot last for too long: Bad news and a recovery
that never arrives congure a situation where rolling might not be possible, and
where the government has to decide whether or not to default.
In our model, if the government decides to default, it has to face a TFP penalty
interpreted as an economic dislocation induced by the default. If on the contrary,
the government decides not to default, then the economy has to generate enough
scal primary surpluses to pay back any maturing bond until the debt is canceled.
These are the debt limits that we compute with the model.
In this paper we compute the debt to GDP threshold where the government
decides to default, and we show that above the computed limit, the government will
choose to default with probability one if lenders decide not to lend. To this end,
we construct a DGE model, calibrated for the Greek economy, where the role of the
government a¤ects a large variety of scal policies on both sides of the government
budget restriction: revenues and expenditures. In our model, total government
spending is divided into several variables: public consumption of goods and ser-
vices; public investment in physical capital; a public wage bill; transfer payments
to households; and interest payments of public debt. As we will show in this paper,
the amount of total debt issued is not independent from the spending policies, as
di¤erent shares of total government spending have di¤erent e¤ects on scal income:
for example, spending in social transfers does not improve productivity of private
factors, whereas increasing public investment does. Therefore, the amount of sus-
tainable debt varies across policies, and this is the ultimate reason why we construct
a model with a very detailed public sector. On the other hand, public revenues are
raised by taxation and new debt issuance, but taxable income varies across policies,
and so will the debt needed to balance public accounts. We consider the existence
of ve taxes: consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax, corporate tax
and a social security tax. Additionally, we include the scal funding of the social
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security system of the economy as a pay-as-you-go system. This rich public sector
modeling is justied because we want to show that Greece was not so di¤erent from
the rest of euro area countries1 and that we have to reject scal indiscipline as the
fundamental cause of the Greek default in favor of an alternative theory such as
gambling for redemption.
We have chosen Greece for our study because it was the rst country under
the Euro currency union to lose its triple A rating on government bonds, and the
country has faced strong pressure to consolidate the budget, to nally default. We
carefully calibrate the model to scal targets to reach the conclusion that Greece
was well inside the sustainable debt to GDP ratio when the crisis hit. Then, the
government decided not to respond with an immediate reduction in government
spending. On the contrary, government spending smoothly kept increasing. The
government consumption to GDP ratio increased as a consequence, rapidly driving
the economy beyond the line we draw and into the region where any additional bad
news could scare investors away. In the meantime, the recovery didnt happen, or the
bad news arrived before the recovery, and the crisis unfolded. Imposing a reasonable
default penalty to TFP, we nd that the debt to GDP ratio of Greece by 2010 was
such that the Greek government would have chosen to default if international lenders
decide not to lend, provoking a self-fullling crisis. We conclude that a gambling for
redemption attitude rather than scal indiscipline is behind the Greek debt crisis
drama.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 discusses the calibration exercise. The main results from the calibrated
model to the Greek economy are shown in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We develop a general equilibrium model where the government a¤ects private de-
cisions in a number of ways. We consider the role of taxes, public consumption of
goods and services, public investment in public capital, public labor markets and
1Even taking into account the suspicion about some creative debt accounting carried out by
the Greek Government in order to meet the Maastricht criteria to join the Euro Zone we nd
that the debt to GDP ratio limit was still well above given the expenditures to GDP ratio for the
years before the crisis. The suspicious creative accounting was probably more important to act
as a coordinating sunspot variable than the e¤ects on actual levels of debt. The Treaty on the
European Union was signed on February 7, 1992 by the members of the European Community in
Maastricht, Netherlands. The Treaty led to the creation of the Euro, and established a set of rules
imposing control over ination, public debt and the public decit, exchange rate stability and the
convergence of interest rates. With regard to public nances it imposed an annual limit of 3% in
the ratio of government decit to GDP, and a 60% of gross government debt prior to the entry in
the European Monetary Union.
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public debt. We rst describe the behavior of the government, then the rms, and
nally the households.
The government displays a high degree of disaggregation in both expenditures
and scal income sides. On the expenditure side, we distinguish four components:
public consumption of goods and services; public investment in capital; public wage
bill; and transfers. On the scal income side, we consider four income taxes (con-
sumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax and corporate tax) plus revenues
from the social security tax. Firms are represented by a CES production function
nested within a standard Cobb-Douglas. The production of the nal output requires
four factors: labor services and capital, both private and public. Finally, consumers
are modeled in a standard way, but including public goods in the utility function
and splitting worked hours between the private and the public labor sectors.
2.1 The Government
First, we describe the elements present in the government budget constraint:
Gt +R
B
t Bt + Dt = Tt +R
D
t Dt + CBTt + Bt (1)
Equation (1) says that all cash outlays (including transfer payments to house-
holds) - for non-interest total government spending (Gt), interest payments of total
government debt (RBt times Bt), and new purchases of nancial assets (Dt) - must
be funded by some combination of tax receipts (Tt), interest earnings on govern-
ment assets (RDt times Dt), transfers from the central bank (CBTt), and new debt
issuance (Bt).
For Euro zone countries, transfers from the central bank are zero, and direct
purchases of government bonds are precluded by the Treaty (i.e. CBTt = 0): If we
denote by Bt the net position of the government, we can also set nancial purchases
to zero (i.e. Dt = 0).
2.1.1 Government spending
Non-interest total government spending is dened as:
Gt = Cg;t + (1 + 
ss
t )Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt (2)
where Cg;t is public consumption of goods and services, Ig;t is public investment,
Wg;tLg;t is the wage bill for public employees,  sst is a social security tax, and Zt are
transfer payments to households, such as welfare, social security or unemployment
benet payments. Public investments accrue into the public structures stock, Kg;t.
We assume the following accumulation process for the public capital:
Kg;t = (1  Kg)Kg;t 1 + Ig;t (3)
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which is analogous to the private capital accumulation process, and where Kg is the
public physical capital depreciation rate.
Next, we need to specify the government spending structure at the time of cali-
bration. This spending structure implies the selection of i) a certain level of public
spending and ii) its distribution among the di¤erent components. The level of
government spending in the long run, given a certain amount of scal revenues,
depends on the target levels for the public decit and public debt. While the Maas-
tricht Treaty establishes limits together with sanctions for decit and debt sinners,
these limits have only been respected to enter into the monetary union, but never
after that date. Therefore, we do not consider the Maastricht criteria to be binding
for these two variables.
The distribution among the di¤erent components of public spending is as follows2
Cg;t = 1Gt
Ig;t = 2Gt
(1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t = 3Gt
Zt = 4Gt
where 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 1. We assume that public spending on goods and services
are constant proportions of total output and these proportions are kept constant all
along the exercise, that is, the governments income and expenditure sides are fully
parametrized. Appendix B reports the results of a sensitivity analysis where both
public spending components and taxes rates are changed.
2.1.2 Tax revenues
The government obtains resources from the economy by taxing consumption and
income from labor, capital and prots, whose e¤ective average tax rates are denoted
by  ct ; 
l
t; 
k
t ; 

t , respectively. Additionally, we consider a pay-as-you-go social secu-
rity system and thus we include the social security tax,  sst . The government budget
in each period is given by,
Tt = 
c
tCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ sst (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 

t t
2This split of the government expenditures can be thought of as the result of maximization of
preferences of the form Ug(Cg;t; Ig;t;Wg;tLg;t; Zt) = logCg;t + log Ig;t + logLg;t + logZt, subjet to
a budget contraint where the Government can spend Gt
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where Cp;t is private consumption, Wp;t is private sector wages, Lp;t is private labor,
Rt is the rental rate of private capital, Kp is the depreciation rate of private capital,
Kp;t is private capital stock, and t are prots to be dened later.
2.1.3 The government identity
As we previously argued the government budget constraint can be written as:
Gt +R
B
t Bt = Tt +Bt+1  Bt
with the meaning that non nancial spending, plus servicing the existing govern-
ment debt must be nanced through taxes plus new debt. Putting together all the
elements dened above, the government budget constraint can be written as:
Cg;t + (1 + 
ss
t )Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt
=  ctCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t)
+ kt (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1 +  sst (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + t t +Bt+1 (4)
or, collecting uses and resources:
Cg;t +Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt
=  ctCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ sst Wp;tLp;t + 

t t +Bt+1 (5)
[Insert here Figure 1]
2.1.4 Default
We have described up to this point a fully parametrized government. We say it is
parametrized in the sense that all those decisions (tax code, expenditure proportions,
public wages, wage premium, and public labor supply) were taken once and for all
time. The only decision the government undertakes at any moment is whether to
honor its debt obligations or, on the contrary, to default. This decision is registered
by a binary variable z = f0; 1g that takes the value z = 0 if the government defaults
in the current period or if it has ever defaulted in the past, and it takes the value
z = 1 if the government decides to honor its debt obligations in the current period.
The decision function used by the government to determine whether to pay or
to default is the utility function of the consumers. In this way we assume that the
Government is benevolent at the moment of taking a crucial decision for the entire
economy. Since the value of z a¤ects the value of other variables in equilibrium, we
will postpone the denition of equilibrium until the model is completely specied.
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2.2 Trade unions
The public labor market is modeled following the work of Fernández de Córdoba,
Pérez and Torres (2012). The purpose of the mechanism described in this section is
to distort the labor market to prevent wages equalization between the private and the
public sector. An analysis of the public labor market among OECD countries show
that the public wage bill is a source of major di¤erences among these economies. Our
analysis shows that government interventions in the wage setting of public wages can
have a signicant e¤ect not only on the wage bill, but also in the growth path of the
economy a¤ecting the income shares of private inputs, having therefore a long-term
e¤ect on the debt budget constraint and the debt limits we want to calculate.
We have chosen a mechanism where the government has preferences over the
number of public workers and their pay. To provide an objective function for the
government dened over wages and employment, we follow a standard text-book
approach (for example see Oswald, Grout and Ulph, 19843) and pose an objective
function for the government as the solution of a game between a public sector union
that cares about the wages of public-sector employees, Wg;t, and a government that
cares about the level of public employment, Lg;t, given its budget constraint. Thus,
the government agrees with the public sector union to maximize the following ob-
jective function subject to a budget constraint:
max

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1=
(6)
where ! is the weight given to wages and  is a negative parameter indicating the
curvature of the trade-o¤ between the elements present in the objective function of
the government. If ! is close to zero, then the main goal of the government is to
maximize public employment (benevolent government preference), whereas if ! is
close to one, the main goal of the government is to maximize public wages (public
sector unions preferred option).
Note that expression (6) encompasses the di¤erent approaches found in the lit-
erature. On the one hand, it takes into account the fact that public employment
and wages are determined in an environment di¤erent to the private sector. The
government itself can increase the number of public employees or can increase public
wages subject to the budgetary constraint. On the other hand, it takes into account
the fact that trade unions are more important in the public labor sector than in the
private sector (see for instance Blanchower, 1996).
As dened previously, the government wage bill is dened as:
3Gt = (1 + 
ss
t )Wg;tLg;t (7)
3On related grounds Ardagna (2007) and Forni and Giordano (2003) consider the wage bill of
the government, employment and wages, separately as arguments of the objective function of the
government or the public sector union.
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Maximizing the government objective function subject to the government budget
constraint is to nd critical values for the auxiliary Lagrangian function:
$g () = max

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1=
+  (3Gt   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t)
That provides, upon di¤erentiation, the rst order necessary conditions:
@$g ()
@Wg;t
=

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1= 1
!W  1g;t   (1 +  sst )Lg;t = 0
@$g ()
@Lg;t
=

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1= 1
(1  !)L 1g;t   (1 +  sst )Wg;t = 0
Dividing orderly:
!W g;t = (1  !)Lg;t (8)
Combining this expression with equation (7) we obtain that public wages and em-
ployment are equal to:
Wg;t =

!
1  !
 1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
(9)
Lg;t =

!
1  !
1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
; if Wg;t > Wp;t (10)
This distribution of the public resources depends on government preferences.
However, private and public sectors are competing for the same labor input and as
a consequence there is a relationship between public sector and private sector wages
inducing a wage premium. The wage premium is implicit in equation (10) and it is
part of the solution of the governments problem. This wage premium ensures the
government that its demand for labor will always be satised. This relationship
will become clearer once we present the households problem.
2.3 Firms
The problem of the rm is to nd optimal values for the utilization of labor and
capital in the presence of public inputs. The representative rm operates a CES
production function nested within a standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
and thus this technology exhibits constant returns to scale. The production of nal
output, Y , requires labor services, L and capital, K, both private and public. Goods
and factors markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The rm rents capital
and hires labor to maximize period prots, taking factor prices and public labor and
capital as given. The technology is given by:
Yt = At(z)K
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 (11)
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where Yt is aggregate output, At(z) is a measure of total-factor productivity that
depends on the variable z = f0; 1g that indicates if the government has defaulted its
debt obligations in the past, with At(1) > At(0), indicating that a default produces
a once and for all reduction in TFP.4 The size of the default penalty is important
for the government, because its size will be crucial to determine the debt frontier
where the crisis zone is dened. Nevertheless, we postpone the determination of its
size until we solve the model.
The parameters 0 < p < 1 and 0 < g < 1 are private and public capital share
of output respectively,  (0 <  < 1) measures the weight of public employment
relative to private employment and  = 1=(1   ) is a measure of the elasticity of
substitution between public and private labor inputs.
If we assume nal output to be the unit of account, prots are dened as:
t = At(z)K
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t](1 p g)=   (1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t  RtKp;t 1
(12)
Under the assumptions that private workers are paid their marginal productivity,
we get:
(1 +  sst )Wp;t = (1 p g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t+ (1 )Lg;t](1 p g )=L 1p;t
Rt = pAt(z)K
p 1
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t](1 p g)=
From the above equations, it is found that private factor incomes are:
(1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t = (1  p   g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t](1 p g )=Lp;t
=
(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt (13)
RtKp;t 1 = pYt (14)
The aggregate production function has four productive factors. However, the
two public factors have no market price. The government does not usually charge a
price that covers the full cost of the services provided with the contribution of public
factors. This implies that those rents generated by public factors are not assigned
4There are several interpretations for this reaction of TFP to a default. The interpretation of
a default penalty seems the most natural, indicating a loss of condence in trade, or an increase
in the uncertainty of the economy. More attractive is the interpretation of the crowding out of
investment that is produced once the debt sold to national banks does not return to the economy
in the form of credits to the private sector after a default.
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to public factors. As public factors are paid by the government, there is a positive
prot, t, which turns out to be:
t = Yt  RtKp;t 1   (1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t > 0
Substituting private factor incomes given by expressions (13) and (14) yields:5
t =

1  p  
(1  p   g)Lg;t
[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]

Yt > 0
We assume that prots are paid out to households given that they are the owners
of the rm.
2.4 Households
In our model economy, the decisions made by consumers are represented by a stand-
in consumer with a period utility where consumption can be decomposed into two
components:
U(Ct; Lt) = U(Cp;t; Cg;t; Lt) (15)
where Cp;t is private consumption and Cg;t is consumption of the same private good
provided by the government to the consumer. We assume that households obtain
utility from the public spending in good and services. In particular, we assume that:
Ct = Cp;t + Cg;t with  2 (0; 1] (16)
Householdspreferences are given by the following instantaneous utility function:
U(Ct; NtH   Lt) =  logCt + (1  ) log(NtH   Lt) (17)
Leisure is NtH   Lt; where H is total time endowment and it is calculated as
the number of e¤ective hours in the week times the number of weeks in a year times
population in the age of taking labor-leisure decisions, Nt; minus the aggregated
number of hours worked in a year, Lt: The parameter  (0 <  < 1) is the fraction
of private consumption on total private income. Households consume nal goods
and supply labor to the private and the public sectors,
Lt = Lp;t + Lg;t (18)
where Lt is the aggregate level of employment, Lp;t is private employment and Lg;t
is public employment. Public employment is chosen by the government and thus
it is exogenous to the households as a quantity constraint. At an aggregate level,
5See appendix A.2 for the derivation of this expression.
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the household can only choose the supply of private labor, Lp;t = Lt   Lg;t. Recall
that public employment demand is fully covered by the household, provided that
Wg;t > Wp;t:
The budget constraint faced by the stand-in consumer is:
(1 +  ct)Cp;t +Kp;t  Kp;t 1
= (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rt   )Kp;t 1
+Zt + (1  t )t (19)
whereKp;t is private capital stock,Wp;t is private compensation per employee,Wg;t is
public compensation per employee, Rt is the rental rate of capital, Kp is the capital
depreciation rate which is modeled as tax deductible, Zt are lump sum transfers and
entitlements, and t denotes prots from rms, as dened previously. The budget
constraint states that consumption and investment in physical capital, cannot exceed
the sum of labor and capital rental incomes and prots net of taxes.
Private capital holdings evolve according to:
Kp;t = (1  Kp)Kp;t 1 + Ip;t (20)
where Ip;t is households gross investment.
The consumer maximizes the value of her lifetime utility given by:
Max
fCt;Ltg1t=0
1X
t=0
t

 log(Cp;t + Cg;t) + (1  ) log(NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t)

(21)
subject to the budget constraint, where (Kp0; Kg0) and the paths of public employ-
ment and taxes are given, and where  2 (0; 1), is the consumers discount factor.
The Lagrangian auxiliary function is: The rst order conditions for the consumer
maximization problem are:
@$
@Cp;t
= 
1
Cp;t + Cg;t
  t(1 +  ct) = 0 (22)
@$
@Lp;t
=  (1  ) 1
NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t
+ t(1   lt)Wp;t = 0 (23)
@$
@Kp;t
= t+1

t+1
 
1 + (1   kt+1)(Rt+1   Kp)
  tt = 0 (24)
plus the budget constraint and a transversality condition stating that the today-
value of long distant future values of assets are zero.
This formulation implies that the wage-setting process in the private sector is
totally di¤erent to that of the public sector. Whereas in the private sector wages
are determined in terms of their marginal products, in the public sector a given
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amount from the governments budget constraint is distributed between public wages
and public employment. Note that the above expressions imply that the consumer
can only choose the supply of private labor, given that public labor is determined
inelastically by the government at a wage that includes a positive premium that
guarantees that all public labor demand is covered by the consumer at any market
wage Wp;t.
2.5 International investors
The rest of the world for this economy is modeled as a single international banker
whose objective is to maximize the discounted dividend xt obtained from the asset
holdings of government bonds. The discount factor is , identical to the consumers
discounting parameter. Purchases of government bonds are denoted by bt. Of course,
supply and demand are equal at all times, so Bt = bt.
max
xt
1X
t=0
txt
s:t: bt+1   bt + xt = wI +Rbtbt
Where wI is a constant endowment.
From the above problem we obtain
(1 +Rbt) = 1 (25)
Walrass Law is satised at all times.6 From equations (24) and (25) we obtain
a non arbitrage steady state condition
(1   k)(R  Kp) = RB
The net real return to capital has to equate the real return of the government
bond, including any risk premium.
3 Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model for the Greek economy to a number of targets.
We select this economy as our case study given that it represents a benchmark for
studying the causes of a debt crisis, as it was the rst country under the European
Monetary Union to lose its triple A rating on government bonds and to adopt a
nancial program. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the public debt/GDP ratio (left
scale) and total public expenditure/GDP ratio (right scale) for the period 2002-2011.
6See Appendix A.1 for a proof.
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Both ratios remain almost constant for the period 2002-2006. As these gures are
central in our analysis, we choose the average values of the macroeconomic variables
for the Greek economy for this period as the targets for our calibration of the model
economy. We choose z = 1 (no default), as the target for the calibration of total
factor productivity.
To calibrate this economy some parameter values are computed from ratios taken
from the national accounts, other parameters are taken from the set of equilib-
rium conditions while the labor factors technological parameters of the nested CES
production function are estimated using OLS. The ratio G=Y; takes values from
the interval G=Y 2 [0:4; 0:6]: For any given vector that denes the scal policy
( k;  l;  c; ;  ss; 1; 2; 3; 4); we calculate the steady state values for prices and
quantities that satisfy the set of rst order conditions and the market clearing equa-
tions described above, for each value of G=Y .
First, the parameters of the model are calibrated to replicate the following tar-
gets taken from the Greek economy: total output at the calibration point (years
2002-2006), is set to Y = 100: From OECD statistics we obtain the ratio of total
government expenditures (G=Y = 0:4504), total (both public and private) invest-
ment (I=Y = 0:2236); and total consumption (C=Y = 0:7764), as well as the fraction
of total labor force actually employed (L=H = 0:5750). Notice that public and pri-
vate consumption plus total investment is total GDP. The reason for this is that
our measure of G adds to public consumption all transfers to the consumer such as
public education, public health, transfers for the unemployed and the public wage
bill. Public investment was about 15% of total investment, which yields a value of
2 = 0:0745; while total public consumption was about 19% of GDP. The value taken
from National Accounts yield a value for 1 = 0:4467: Computing private and public
capital depreciation rates is a di¢ cult task, since it involves computing what types
of investments are done, and what is the depreciation rate for each of them. Due to
its intrinsic di¢ culty, we use the estimates of Mas et al. (2010) for the Spanish econ-
omy, which implies that Kp = 0:08 and Kg = 0:04, and hence, we compute steady
state values for capital as Kp = Ip=Kp = 237:5750 and Kg = Ig=Kg = 83:8500:
The depreciation rate for public capital is lower than for private capital given their
di¤erent composition. These calculations imply that public capital stock represents
around 26% of total capital stock for the calibrated economy and that total capital
stock is 3.2 times total output.
The values for e¤ective average tax rates ( c;  l;  k; ;  ss) are taken from Boscá
et al. (2012), who use the methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994). The
nominal return of the Greek bond at the calibration period was RB = 0:041: Equa-
tion (25), provides a steady state relationship between RB and : The value we
obtain is  = 0:96: Once we have this value, equation (24) together with the value
of Kp and 
k = 0:1640 delivers R = 0:12094: From equation (14) and the value for
public capital we obtain a value for p = 0:3061:
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Next, equate the marginal products of public and private capital to get:
Rp;t = pAt(z)K
p 1
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Rg;t = gAt(z)K
p
p;t 1K
g 1
g;t 1 [L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Rp;t
Rg;t
=
p
g
Kg;t 1
Kp;t 1
If we assume that the real return to public capital is equal to the real return
to private capital, we can compute a value for g = p(Kg=Kp) = 0:1082: With
the OECD data series on public sector labor and wages for Greece, we obtain the
ratio of public labor to private labor in 2002-2006, Lg=Lp = 0:2399; while the wage
premium for the same years was about, Wg=Wp = 1:4:
Comparing Greeces labor market with Europe (Figures 2 and 3), we observe the
same trend of a decrease in the participation of public labor in total employment,
with an increase in the wage premium. The dissimilarity that might have scal
consequences relates to the level of the wage premium. While in Europe in 2002-
2006 the average wage premium was about 1:25, we nd a value of 1:4 for 2002
for Greece. The weight of public employment relative to private employment and
the elasticity of substitution between public and private labor inputs are estimated
econometrically. From the production function, we can obtain the ratio of public
wages to private wages as:7
Wg;t
Wp;t
=
1  

L 1g;t
L 1p;t
(26)
From this expression we get, taking logs
log

Wg;t
Wp;t

= log

1  


+ (   1) log

Lg;t
Lp;t

(27)
and estimate by OLS.8 From the estimation for Greece we obtain the values for
 = 0:6008 and  = 0:4326: Results from the estimation are represented in the lower
panel of Figures 2 and 3, where it can be observed that the t of the estimated
model is quite good. When we estimate the coe¢ cients of equation (27) we nd
values of  and  that imply that a wage premium is being paid by the government
to public workers.
We set a total labor endowment of H = 100; and from the OECD labor statistics
we have L = 57:500 for the year 2002. This number, plus the public to private labor
7See appendix A.2 for a derivation of equation (26).
8The estimation procedure is explained in Fernández-de-Córdoba, Pérez and Torres (2012).
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ratio yield the corresponding values for Lp; and Lg: The production function gets
fully calibrated computing A(1) as a residual:
A(1) =
Y
K
p
p K
g
g [L

p + (1  )Lg ]
(1 p g)

= 1:6135
Fix  =  1; in the government public sector objective function, and compute the
value for ! as
! =
1
1 +

Wg
Lg
 = 0:0794
Finally, we compute  as:
 =
Cp + Cg
Cp + Cg + (H   Lp   Lg)Wp 1  l1+k
= 0:8384
The public wage bill of Greece 3, is obtained as the public wage bill over total
government expenditures 3 = (1 +  s)WgLg=G = 0:3213. Finally, putting together
the di¤erent fractions of government expenditures we obtain as a residual the value
of 4 = 1  1   2   3 = 0:1572 as total transfers to consumers.
We collect the parameter values in two tables. The rst table (Table 1) contains
values taken from National Accounts, average e¤ective tax rates, depreciation rates
And the wage premium. Table 2 shows the set of parameters that we calibrate using
the equilibrium conditions from the model.
[Insert here Figure 2]
[Insert here Figure 3]
Table 1: The Greek economy calibration targets
Parameter Denition Value
RB Nominal return of a Greek bond 0.041
Y Total GDP 100
G=Y Ratio total public spending/output 0.4504
I=Y Ratio total investment/output 0.2336
C=Y Ratio total consumption/output 0.7764
L=H Employment/labor endowment 0.5750
Lg=Lp Public labor/private labor 0.2399
Wg=Wp Public sector wage premium 1.4
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Table 2: Government parameters
Parameter Denition Value
Greece Germany
1 Ratio public consumption/total government expenditure 0.4467 0.4024
2 Ratio public investment/total government expenditure 0.0745 0.0432
3 Ratio public wage bill/total government expenditure 0.3213 0.1712
4 Ratio public transfers/total government expenditure 0.1575 0.3832
 l Labor income tax rate 0.4100 0.3810
 k Capital income tax rate 0.1640 0.1810
 ss Social security contribution 0.3560 0.3390
 Prot tax rate 0.2500 0.3870
 c Consumption tax rate 0.1480 0.1240
B=Y Ratio public debt/output 1.0882 0.6560
N Fraction of debt renanced every period 7 11
Table 3: Calibration of the economy
Parameter Denition Value
Greece Germany
 Discount factor 0.9606 0.9606
Kp Private capital depreciation rate 0.0800 0.0800
Kg Public capital depreciation rate 0.0400 0.0400
 Public-Private labor elasticity of substitution 0.4326 0.5762
 Private employment weight 0.6008 0.6640
p Private capital income share 0.3066 0.2556
l Labor share 0.5852 0.6026
g Public capital technical parameter 0.1082 0.1418
A TFP 1.6135 1.6422
 Consumption-leisure preferences 0.8956 0.8792
Greek gures for taxes, scal revenues, total government spending and its dis-
tribution are not so di¤erent from the gures for the rest of countries in the euro
area. The tax menu is very similar to countries such as Germany. Fiscal revenues
(including social security contributions) to GDP ratio for Greece is in the line of the
rest euro area countries and even higher than countries like Ireland. Furthermore,
government spending to GDP ratio was about 45% for Greece compared to the 47%
for Germany or 53% for France, and public to private labor ratio is around 24% for
Greece compared to about 32% for France.
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4 Equilibrium, debt frontier and default
Given the calibrated values for the parameters for the Greek economy, we compute
the steady state of the model. In our framework, private agents decisions are not
only a¤ected by the tax menu, but also by the composition of public spending.
The composition of public spending is critical for output and, thus, also for scal
revenues. As a consequence, the amount of total debt is not independent of the
spending policies, since di¤erent shares of total government spending have di¤erent
e¤ects on scal income: for example spending in social transfers does not improve
productivity of private factors, whereas increasing public investment does. The
e¤ects of these di¤erent policies imply that the amount of sustainable debt varies
across policies. This is an important property of our theoretical framework.
The questions that we want to respond is: Given a tax menu, given the govern-
ment expenditure and its distribution and given a perpetual default penalty imposed
on TFP if the government decides to default, What is the level of debt that leaves
the government indi¤erent between honoring and defaulting the debt? Honoring the
debt implies to pay large sums that could otherwise be used in providing goods to
the consumer, investing in public capital, paying to public workers or transferring
income to the poor. Defaulting implies the opposite, but in turn, the country faces
a once and for all penalty for defaulting its debt.
The answer to this question comes from the decision problem taken by a benevo-
lent government that maximizes the utility of the consumer given by equation (15).
This problem is:
maxU(Cp;t + Cg;t; Lt) + EtV (Bt+1; zt)
s:t: Gt + zR
B
t Bt = Tt + Bt (28)
z = 0 or z = 1; but z = 0 if z 1 = 0
With the model economy parametrized to replicate the size of the government
for the period 2002-2006 we proceed to dene a steady state where the economy can
roll over the existing debt as follows.
Denition of steady state with rolling over (z = 1): An equilibrium for
this economy is a vector of prices (W g ;W

p ; R

p; R

g; R
B), a vector of input quantities
(Lg; L

p; K

g ; K

p), and a vector of private consumption and investment (C

p ; I

p ) such
that for a given scal policy summarized by a collection of taxes ( c;  l;  k;  ss; )
and expenditure proportions (1; 2; 3; 4); induces a vector of public consumption,
investment, transfers, and debt services (Cg ; I

g ; Z
; RBB), such that the optimiza-
tion problems of the household, the rm, and the government are satised in a way
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that the resources constraints are satised and all markets clear with TFP given by
A(1).
This steady state induces a level of welfare for the consumer given by
U =
1
1  U(C

p ; C

g ; L
) (29)
We can compute one steady state with rolling over for every ratio G=Y and build
what we call the "debt frontier", dened as the sustainable debt limit for each level
of public expenditure. Sustainable debt limit here stands for a level where scal
income is su¢ cient to cover current government expenditures and the service of
debt. This notion of sustainable debt limit coincides formally with the steady state
level of debt (with constant bond yields) for the model we have presented.
[Insert here Figure 4]
From the model we obtain a numerical representation of the trade-o¤ between
public debt long-run sustainable limit and government size measured as the total
government spending to GDP ratio. A larger government size, given a constant
level of public revenues, corresponds to a lower long-run sustainable level of public
debt. The debt frontier is the relationship between public expenditure to GDP
ratio, G=Y; and total debt to GDP ratio, B=Y , implied by the government budget
constraint. Above the curve, we have all pairs where given the ratio G=Y; the
amount of endogenous scal revenues are not enough to cover the services of total
debt, RBB. Below the curve, we have all data pairs where scal revenues su¢ ce
to cover the given G=Y ratio and services the outstanding debt. Figure 4 above,
shows that the ratios of public expenditures and total debt where very far from the
debt limit, calculated with the real return of bonds set at 1% for the period 2002-
2006. Figure 4 also plots the actual values of G=Y and B=Y ratios for the period
2002-2006. These ratios, remained almost constant for the period 2002-2006 at a
value of total public spending/GDP of 45% and a public debt/GDP of around 100%.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In our model, public debt is modeled as
if bond markets were innitely liquid and thus, any maturing bond can always be
rolled over at the given rate in the steady state. In this context, the long term
sustainable amount of debt depends on both public revenues and expenditures and
on the public bond interest rate. The sustainable debt limit is increasing in public
revenues and decreasing in public expenditure and bond interest rate. A negative
shock to output will reduce both the public income/output ratio and the public
expenditure/output ratio, driving the economy toward the long-run unsustainable
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debt area on one hand, and reducing the long-run sustainable amount of debt on
the other hand.
The strong negative shock to output su¤ered by the Greek economy from 2007
onwards is reected in Figure 5 as an increase in the public-income/output ratio
and the public-expenditure/output ratio, driving the economy toward the long-run
unsustainable debt area on one hand, and reducing the long-run sustainable amount
of debt on the other hand. Simple inspection of the gures suggests that the Greek
government decided to run large decits while waiting for a recovery to come. After
12 quarters running decits and piling debt, the yields of the Greek debt rose to
a nominal yield of 12% in December 2010. In Figure 5 we plot two debt frontiers.
The steeper one is the original computed frontier for a real return of bonds of 1%,
consistent with the steady sate. The other is a debt frontier using a real return of
9%; but keeping constant the rest of parameters values consistent with the steady
state (that is, without recalibrating our model economy). By 2009, Greeks scal
ratios crossed the debt frontier. They where located in a place where scal revenues
would be insu¢ cient to service the existing debt at the new yields.
[Insert here Figure 5]
The debt level dened by the debt frontier becomes relevant when we consider the
likelihood of a sun-spot variable capable to coordinate international investors scaring
them away from buying bonds. The information obtained from a debt frontier
crossing is that such situation has to be reverted. If no signals are produced, a
self-fulling crisis can be started at any moment. Moreover, at any time this fully
parametrized government can take the decision of defaulting on its debts, and thus
a di¤erent steady state is induced by the decision of defaulting. The steady state
for this economy after default is as follows.
Denition of steady state under default (z = 0): An equilibrium for
this economy is a vector of prices (W dg ;W
d
p ; R
d
p; R
d
g), a vector of input quantities
(Ldg; L
d
p; K
d
g ; K
d
p ); and a vector of private consumption and investment (C
d
p ; I
d
p ) such
that for a given scal policy summarized by a collection of taxes ( c;  l;  k;  ss; )
and expenditure proportions (1; 2; 3; 4); induce a vector of public consumption,
investment, and transfers (Cdg ; I
d
g ; Z
d), such that the optimization problems of the
household, the rm, and the government are satised in a way that the resources
constraints are satised and all markets clear with TFP given by A(0), where
A(0) = 0:95 A(1).
In this case, the long term welfare level attained by the consumer is given by
Ud =
1
1  U(C
d
p ; C
d
g ; L
d) (30)
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Notice that the scenario with default introduces two modications in the deni-
tion of equilibrium. First, the production function with government default is given
by
Yt = At(0)K
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 (31)
We choose a permanent default penalty of 5% as in Cole and Kehoe (1996) and
Conesa and Kehoe (2015). Therefore TFP after a default is set to be 0.95 of the
calibrated value for TFP in the scenario where the government honors its debt, and
reported in Table 2. This results At(0) = 1:9234. The second modication occurs in
the government restriction which is simplied to be Gt = Tt under default. We can
compute the equilibrium path for every possible value of (B=Y;G=Y ) and to obtain
the associated utility, denoted by UdB0
Y0
;
G0
Y0
.
However, in our context, the level of sustainable debt indicated by the debt
frontier is not the only relevant debt level. There is also a debt level where the
government can honor its debt independently of what international investors and
market yields do. For example, if international lenders do not lend, and yields rise,
the government could decide not to roll over, but instead to pay back any maturing
bond until all outstanding debt gets canceled. If the government decides to pay
back all outstanding debt, then a constant fraction of the total debt has to be paid
out every year until all bonds mature. We follow Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012)
considering that the fraction of debt that has to be repaid corresponds to the average
maturity of debt. If in period k the government decides to repay, and the average
maturity of debt is , then the government budget constraint is
Gk +
1

Bk = Tk
... =
...
Gk+ 1 +
1

Bk+ 1 = Tk+ 1
Gk++j = Tk++j; j = 0; 1; 2 : : :
We use the value of  = 4, which corresponds to the average maturity on the Greek
debt in the year 2010 (see Figure 7), to calculate the equilibrium paths starting at
any point as we did with the default path, to obtain the associated level of utility,
denoted by UpbB0
Y0
;
G0
Y0
.
So for a given level of (G=Y ), we can vary the ratio (B=Y ), and compute the
utility level associated to each pair. Comparing these two utility levels with that of
an economy where it is always possible to roll over new debt, we construct Figure 6.
In Figure 6, the ratio (G=Y ) is xed to the level where default occurred in 2010,
and the debt to GDP ratio level varies from 0% to 350%. Two thresholds appear.
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The debt to GDP that makes it preferable for the government to default if lenders
decide not to lend, and the debt to GDP ratio where the government decides to
default even if international lenders were ready to lend.
At the point where the utility of paying back equates the utility of default we
have a threshold of debt. We nd that this threshold is consistent with the debt
frontier we have calculated. For a level of around B=Y = 150% at the long-term
unsustainable area dened by the debt frontier, we have that Greece would have
preferred (as she did) to default if lenders decide not to lend (as it happened). The
second threshold in Figure 6 is found near a point were B=Y = 300%. At this point,
the government would choose to default even if international lenders are willing to
lend and they do not expect a default.
[Insert here Figure 6]
From these pictures, we conclude that the current nancial crisis a¤ecting Greece
has to be explained by an approach not directly linked to the fundamentals of
the economy, as a carefully calibrated neoclassical growth model shows. Prior to
the crisis, the Greek economy was well inside the long-run sustainable debt area
with a public budget carrying with it a constant level of public debt/GDP ratio.
Nevertheless, the crisis rapidly deteriorated output and public revenues, driving the
Greek economy to a situation where it was vulnerable to the realization of a sun-
spot capable of coordinating investors to require more yield to buy debt. Once yields
rise, the frontier rapidly moves downwards to the left, leaving the Greek economy
in a situation that cannot be sustained in the long-run. But increasing yields, and
decreasing maturities forced a situation where a default was preferable than paying
back, with the resulting default.
One can argue that the initial value of public debt was too high (around 100%
of GDP) and that a lower level of public debt would have increased the strength of
the Greek economy to cope with the crisis and remain in the long-run sustainable
area. However, looking to the evolution of the Greek economy from 2007 onwards,
an initial lower level of public debt does not guarantee that it would have avoided
the debt crisis, given the evolution of Public Expenditures to GDP. From Figure 5
it is clear that small reductions in the public expenditure to GDP ratio induce large
increases in the debt to GDP ratio. The immediate implication is that reductions
of expenditure above the expected decrease in GDP, together with an increase in
scal revenues from increased taxation should be enough to guarantee the solvency
of the Greek State. Conversely, increases in the public expenditures to GDP ratio
deteriorates the credit position very rapidly. The data shows that the swing to the
right in the expenditures to GDP ratio from 2006 to 2009 was too large.
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5 Conclusions
This paper develops a DGE model in which the government is fully characterized
in both income and spending sides. Calibration of the model for the Greek econ-
omy provides evidence in favor of a gambling for redemption attitude towards the
crisis, as in Conesa and Kehoe (2015) and Arellano, Conesa and Kehoe (2012). The
gambling for redemption hypothesis can explain quite well the path of the Greek
economy from 2007 onwards. As Conesa and Kehoe (2015) point out, countries that
are in deep recessions have the incentive to cut government spending very slowly and
increase the public debt, gambling that a recovery in the economy will lead to larger
scal revenues. This argument is consistent with the recent experience of Greece
during the period 2007-2009. Nevertheless, the debt-sustainability problem emerges
when the recession is prolonged as indeed was the case. In this situation, govern-
ment revenues never recover and the gamble for redemption cannot be maintained
indenitely, forcing the default. The main consequence we extract from our analysis
is that the Greek government gambled for redemption and lost the bet. Period by
period for three consecutive years, the global economy deteriorated, scal revenues
never recovered, and suddenly astronomical bond yields indicated that the game
was over. When a recession is exceptionally long lasting, gambling for redemption
is a bad choice.
However, the historically observed frequency of the cycle can entice governments
to gamble for redemption with the hope that the next expected expansion will
dissolve past scal decits. This implies that the gambling for redemption attitude
towards a crisis can be the product of our past statistical knowledge of the cycle.
It is reasonable, as we argue, and also optimal as Conesa and Kehoe demonstrate,
to gamble for redemption when purely statistically based policies are put in place.
Once the economic policy that emerges from a gambling for redemption strategy is
proved incorrect by reality, some structural adjustments have to be put in place.
The table in Appendix B shows that policies oriented to increase productivity, to-
gether with a scal package that includes increases in VAT, labor taxes and corporate
taxes, plus a re-structuring of public expenditures increasing public investment, at
the expense of transfers, can be e¤ective to solve a debt crisis. The proposed combi-
nation of increasing by 10% the following vector of policy instruments ( k;  l; ; 3)
would depress output by  2:37%; it would depress private consumption and pub-
lic consumption by  2:30% and  2:37% respectively, and it would depress total
investment by  4:98%; but it would rise the debt ceiling by 24:47%:
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Appendix A.1: WalrasLaw
Take the budget constraint faced by the consumer:
(1 +  ct)Cp;t +Kp;t  Kp;t 1
= (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rt   )Kp;t 1 + Zt + t
And substitute the value of
Zt = Gt   Cg;t   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t   Ig;t
to obtain:
(1 +  ct)Cp;t + Igt +Kp;t  Kp;t 1
= (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rp;t   )Kp;t 1
+Gt   Cg;t   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t + t
Or,
Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt
=   ctCp;t + (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] +Rp;tKp;t 1    kt
 
Rp;t   Kp

Kp;t 1
+Gt   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t + t
But, the government identity establishes the following relation:
(1 +RBt )Bt  Bt+1 = Tt  Gt
Direct substitution yields
Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt   Tt  Bt+1 + (1 +RBt )Bt
=   ctCp;t + (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] +Rp;tKp;t 1    kt
 
Rt   Kp

Kp;t 1
 (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t + t
Government scal income is given by:
Tt = 
c
tCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rp;t   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ sst (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t)
Substitution and elimination drives to:
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Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt  Bt+1 + (1 +RBt )Bt
= Wp;tLp;t +RtKp;t 1 + t +  sst Wp;tLp;t
From the denition of prots we nd that,
t = Yt   (1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t  Rp;tKp;t
Substitution yields:
Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt = Yt +Bt+1   (1 +RBt )Bt
Which implies that all uses come from all available resources from an open economy.
Therefore, WalrasLaw is satised at all times.
Appendix A.2: Positive prots
In a private economy where the government supply capital and labor with market
pricing, the rm would have a prot function as:
t = Yt   (1 +  sst )(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) Rp;t(Kp;t 1 +Kg;t 1)
where
Yt = At(z)K
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Under the assumptions that private factors are paid their marginal productivity,
we get:
(1 +  sst )Wp;t = (1  p   g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1p;t
(A.2.1)
(1+ sst )Wg;t = (1 )(1 p g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t+(1 )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1g;t
(A.2.2)
Rp;t = pAt(z)K
p 1
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Rg;t = gAt(z)K
p
p;t 1K
g 1
g;t 1 [L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

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Division of equation (A.2.1) by (A.2.2) yields equation (26) of Section 3. From
the above equations we can obtain all income shares as:
(1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t = (1  p   g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 Lp;t
=
(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt
(1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t = (1  )(1  p   g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 Lg;t
=
(1  )(1  p   g)Lg;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt
Rp;tKp;t 1 = pYt
and
Rg;tKg;t 1 = gYt
Prots are zero because of the homogeneity of the production function:
t = Yt  
(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt  
(1  )(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Y   pYt   gYt;
t = Yt (1  (1  p   g)  p   g) = 0
If, on the contrary, the government pays public factor through taxes as it is
assumed in the paper, then there are positive prots which can be calculated as the
di¤erence between total output and the rents paid to the private factors:
t = Yt  Rp;tKp;t 1   (1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t > 0
Substituting private factor incomes yields:
t =

1  p  
(1  p   g)Lg;t
[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]

Yt > 0
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Appendix A.3: Equilibrium conditions
The collection of the models rst order conditions, market clearing and resource
constraints are:

Cp;t + Cg;t
  t(1 +  ct) = 0 (A.3.1a)
1  
NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t
  t(1   lt)Wp;t = 0 (A.3.1b)


t+1
 
1 + (1   kt+1)(Rt+1   Kp)
  t = 0 (A.3.2)
t 1   t(1 +RBt ) = 0 (A.3.3)
Yt   At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 = 0 (A.3.4)
Rp;t   pAt(z)Kp 1p;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 = 0 (A.3.5)
(1 +  sst )Wp;t 
(1  p   g)At(z)Kpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1p;t = 0
(A.3.6)
t  

g +
(1  )(1  p   g)Lg;t
[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]

Yt = 0 (A.3.7)
Kp;t   ((1  Kp)Kp;t 1 + Ip;t) = 0 (A.3.8)
Kg;t  
 
(1  Kg)Kg;t 1 + Ig;t

= 0 (A.3.9)
Gt   (Cg;t + (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt) = 0 (A.3.10)
Cg;t   1Gt = 0 (A.3.11)
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Ig;t   2Gt = 0 (A.3.12)
(1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t   3Gt = 0 (A.3.13)
Zt   4Gt = 0 (A.3.14)
Wg;t  

!
1  !
 1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
= 0 (A.3.15)
Lg;t  

!
1  !
1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
= 0 (A.3.16)
Tt  

 ctCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ sst (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
tR
B
t Bt(z) + 

t t

= 0 (A.3.17)
Gt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt(z)  (Tt +Bt+1(z)) = 0 (A.3.18)
Lt   Lp;t   Lg;t = 0 (A.3.19)
This set of conditions fully characterizes a unique solution for any given policy
vector. The set of equations of the model is completed with the budget constraint
of the consumer and the following transversality conditions:
lim
t!1
ttKt = 0
lim
t!1
(1 +RBt )
 tBt(z) = 0
The rst transversality condition means that the present value of future capital,
Kt, must be going to zero. The second transversality condition requires a zero limit
of future government debt discounted at the bond rate.
From this set of equations we can dene the set of equilibria used by the gov-
ernment to take the default choice. Given a history of default z = f0; 1g equations
(A.3.4), (A.3.5), (A.3.6), (A.3.17) and (A.3.18) are conveniently modied to accom-
modate the equilibrium with rolling over and the equilibrium under default.
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Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis
The results shown in the paper relate interest rates to the ratios Gt=Yt and Bt=Yt:
We have seen during the crisis enormous variations in the yields that the Greek
bond had to pay to be attractive in the markets. In the calibration period 2002-
2006, we observe a steady relation in the ratio G=Y ' 0:45; and B=Y ' 100%:
The implication is that when the yield of the bond increases by a factor of four, the
expenditure made by the government in any other area has to decrease by a similar
amount, and we know how extremely di¢ cult this is. The result is that an enormous
jump in the debt frontier has to take place.
In this appendix we analyze the sensitivity of the calibrated model to changes
in some key parameters. Table B.1 shows the percentage change in the relevant
variables given an increase of 10% in the parameters of the rst row. Several inter-
esting results emerge from this sensitivity analysis. Overall, this exercise shows the
robustness of the model. As expected, a rise in Total Factor Productivity increases
output, consumption and investment in the same amount. Additionally, the sus-
tainable debt level increases by 14%, showing that public debt sustainability is also
very sensible to productivity shocks.
An increase in taxes has a negative impact on all macroeconomic variables but
on the sustainable debt level. From our model specication, a higher level of public
revenues, given a particular government size, allows to cover a higher amount of
debt services. The higher impact came from the labor income tax and consumption
tax.
The reaction of our model economy to changes in total government spending
composition is of interest. A rise in the proportion of public consumption (1) does
not a¤ect output and investment, reducing private consumption and raising public
consumption by the same amount. Nevertheless, this policy change reduces the
long-run sustainability debt limit by around 1%. A rise in public investment (2)
has a positive impact on all macroeconomic variables, raising the long-run debt
limit by 0.82%. The positive impact of a rise in public wage bill (3) on output,
consumption and investment is easily explained, as more public employment is added
to the aggregate production function, in spite of a fall in private employment. At
the same time, the residual parameter 4 is reduced by the same amount. Therefore
public accounts remain unchanged while more factors are placed into the production
function. The table also shows that a change in the composition of wages and
public employment has mild e¤ects on the economy. A reduction in civil servants
compensations increases the debt ceiling by just 0:31% at the cost of  0:7% decrease
in output.
Table B.1: Sensitivity Analysis
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10% Y Cp Cg Ip Ig B Lp Lg Wp
A 15.51 15.51 15.51 15.51 15.51 13.96 -1.41 7.47 16.00
 k -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.37 -0.11 0.37 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09
 l -2.87 -2.87 -2.87 -2.87 -2.87 11.40 -3.38 -1.44 0.29
 c -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 7.18 -0.60 -0.25 0.05
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kp -2.61 -2.93 -2.61 -1.44 -2.61 -2.88 0.40 -1.31 -2.80
Kg -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.01 0.11 -0.55 -1.14
! -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 0.31 1.04 -5.45 -0.98
1 0.00 -1.26 10.00 0.00 0.00 -0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.29 0.78 1.29 1.29 11.42 0.82 0.10 0.64 1.13
3 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 7.58 -0.98 5.21 0.92
We complete our sensitivity analysis with a variation of the yield. Figure 8 shows
how the frontier moves inwards as a consequence of an increase in the yield of the
Greek bond. We represent the frontier for a 4%, 5% and a 7% yields, recalibrating
the other parameters values of the model economy to the new interest rate. Notice
that the e¤ective spreads of the Greek bond with respect to the German Bund
were much larger. Since the very beginning of the negotiations of the details of the
rescue package for Greece by April 2010, the spreads skyrocketed due to a number
of reasons. One of those reasons is discussed in Chamley and Pinto (2011). They
argue that the seniority of the new bonds issued to nance the rescue program
would disincentive other private investors from buying Greek bonds. However, we
agree with Arellano, Conesa and Kehoe (2012) in saying that the rescue package
was an e¤ective mechanism to provide liquidity to the Greek State at a controlled
yield. Figure 8 shows that the scal ratios displayed by the Greek economy prior to
the crisis were sustainable at the yield of 5%, that is, the real return of the rescue
package bond was consistent with a long-term sustainability of the Greek State prior
to the unfolding of events that drove Greece to the current crisis. Nevertheless, the
pre-crisis gures were unsustainable at the yield of 7%.
[Insert here Figure 8]
Appendix C: Data Sources
The frequency of the data is annual for the period 2002-2011. The model is calibrated
using data for the sub-period 2002-2006, which is selected as the steady state for our
model economy. GDP, government expenditure, public debt, private consumption,
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private investment, public investment and public consumption are taken from the
OECD Statistics data base and Eurostat. Data on capital stock are taken from the
EU-KLEMS database.
Public and private compensation of employees and public and private employ-
ment are taken from OECD Economic Outlook database December 2007 Issue, for
the period 1960-2006. Public wage bill is calculated as total nal public compensa-
tion of employees.
E¤ective average tax rates are taken from Boscá et al (2012), who use the
methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994), and from OECD Revenue Statis-
tics.
Finally, real return of Greek bond corresponds to the 10 year bond yield are
taken from Bloomberg database, and the average maturity of debt can be seen
in http://www.pdma.gr/index.php/en/public-debt-strategy/public-debt/historical-
characteristics/weighted-average-cost-maturity-of-annual-funding
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Figure 1: Public expenditures (G) and debt (B), as a proportion of GDP (Y).
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
0.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
250.
3
0.
35
P
u
b
li
c
la
b
or
/
P
ri
va
te
la
b
or
,
G
re
ec
e
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
1
1.
52
2.
5
P
u
b
li
c
C
om
p
en
sa
ti
on
p
er
em
p
lo
ye
e
/
P
ri
va
te
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
on
p
er
em
p
lo
ye
e,
G
re
ec
e
 
 
D
at
a
M
od
el
Figure 2: Estimation of labor technological parameters
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Figure 3: Same t for Europe
05010
0
15
0
20
0
25
0 4
0
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
Total debt to GDP ratio: B
t
/Y
t
Pu
bl
ic 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 to
 G
DP
 ra
tio
: G
t/Y
t
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
Figure 4: The debt frontier before the crisis
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Figure 5: The debt frontier after gambling
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Figure 6: Default thresholds in normal times
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Figure 7: Public debt average maturity (Source: Greek Public Debt Management
Agency)
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Figure 8: Sensitivity Analysis
